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THE JUDICIAL CORRECTION OF JUDICIAL
ERRORS
A most interesting problem is presented by a recent incident
in the jurisprudence of the State of New York.
There has never been a time in the history of the chief city
of that State when an encroachment upon the street by an
abutting owner has been anything other than a trespass upon
public property, and a public nuisance; yet from time immemorial
the officials of that city have permitted, or have attempted to
legalize, encroachments of many feet beyond the street line, and
have connived at a continuous obstruction of public traffic which
has been fairly scandalous. They have even enacted municipal
ordinances regulating the extent to which encroachments would
be permitted.- These ordinances have created the locally famous
"stoop line," which is merely an imaginary line on the sidewalk
to which abutting owners were tacitly permitted to extend their
front steps, or stoops, and other projections from the building,
and beyond which they were warned that they must not go.
Even at that, however, many encroachments were carried beyond
the stoop line, and the city authorities were conveniently blind
to the resulting obstruction of traffic. For years plans for such
encroachme nts have been approved by the Building Department
in direct violation of even the lax provisions of the ordinances.
The courts themselves have connived at this violation of the
law. There is a long series of decisions in which they sustained
obstructions on the public highways. Thus, in an action brought
by the People to compel the removal of a shed on a public pier
erected pursuant to a permit from the Building Department, the
Court of Appeals held that the shed could 'be legally constructed.
2
Again, officials of the city charged with the iuty of removing
obstructions on the street were enjoined from removing an iron
awning which, in accordance with an express ordinance of the
Common Council, covered the entire sidewalk3 An act of the
1 Cosby, Code of Ordinances, p. 54, § 247, and note; see also, ibid., p.
46, § 2i9, and note.
2 People v. B. & 0. R. R. Co. (1889) 1 V N. Y. i5o, 155.
3Hoey v. Gilroy (i8gi) i N. Y. 132.
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legislature authorizing a limited use of the sidewalks in front
of buildings for stoops, cellar openings or underground vaults
for the more convenient and beneficial enjoyment of the adjacent
premises was sustained.4 The court refused to enjoin, on com-
plaint of one property owner, the construction of encroaching
bay windows by an adjoining property owner.5 The climax of
these decisions was reached in two opinions from which it will
be pertinent to take extracts.
In the case of Broadbelt v. Loew the defendant objected to a
title which the plaintiff tendered to him under a contract of sale.
The objection was that certain bay windows illegally projected
beyond the street line and constituted a defect which rendered the
title unmarketable. The Appellate Division, an intermediate
appellate tribunal, declared the title good. In the course of its
opinion, the court expressed itself in the following terms:
"In view of the ordinances of the common council of
the city of Mqew York and of the acquiescence of the
authorities of the city in the allowance of constructions
such as those connected with the plaintiff's houses, the
possibility of the owner ever being molested is so exceed-
ingly remote that the objections become technical only
and not substantial."
The judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals "on the opinion below," which means that the Court
of Appeals expressly adopted this opinion as an accurate
expression of its own views.7 A little later the same Appellate
Division in the case of Levy v. HiWl dismissed an action brought
by the plaintiff to obtain an allowance from the purchase price
fixed in a contract for the purchase of certain premises on 34 th
Street, because of the fact that the front stoop projected beyond
the building line and encroached on the street. The court dis-
missed the complaint, using this language:
"This stoop has been in its present condition for
upwards of thirty years without objection on the part
of the municipality or any of the adjoining property
owners. That any serious objection by any one could now
be made to the continuance of this stoop in the condition
4 lorgensen v. Squires (1895) 144 N. Y. 280.
5 Wormser v. Brown (1&96) 149 N. Y. 163.
6 (1897) i5 App. Div. 343.
. (igoo) 62 N. Y. 642.
8 (igoo) So App. Div. 294.
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it is in, is such a remote contingency that it could hardly
be considered a serious objection to the title."
Such was the state of the decisions in igoo, when the Broad-
belt and Levy cases were decided. In 19o3, however, out of
a clear sky, came the case of Ackerman v. True.9 In that case
the -Court of Appeals held that Mrs. Charlotte Y. Ackerman,
the plaintiff, was entitled to an affirmative order requiring the
owner of adjoining property to remove a bay window which he
had constructed and which projected over the public highway.
This case was immediately followed by a flood of decisions in the
Appellate Division and in the Court of Appeals itself declaring
in no uncertain terms that an encroachment on the street is a
trespass upon public property and a public nuisance, which
neither the legislature of the State nor the municipal authorities
can lawfully authorize.10 These cases approach the question
from practically all possible angles. Encroachments were
enjoined at the instance of adjoining owners, public officials
were required by writs of mandamus to remove them, and, at
least in cases in which they constituted a structural part of the
abutting building, they were held to create a defect in the title.
This change in the views of the courts was more than merely
legal: it brought about an enormous property loss as well. The
municipal authorities swept through the principal business streets
of the city like a besom of destruction and removed, or required
the owners to remove, all encroachments beyond the street line.
Some of these had been standing for years; some of them were
structural parts of buildings; all of them had been sanctioned
by the several authorities of the city government; and one, at
least, that in the Levy case, had been specifically sanctioned by
the courts themselves. The cost to the citizens mounted into
the millions, and, as the process will undoubtedly continue, there
is no visible limit to the ultimate total.
How complete was the change in the position of the courts
9 (1903) 175 N. Y. 353.
10 City of N. Y. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (1905) lO4 App. Div. 223;
McMillan v. Klaw & Erlanger Co. (19o5) lO7 App. Div. 407; Williams
v. Silverman Realty & Constr. Co. (i9o6) iii App. Div. 679; Hatfield v.
Straus (1907) 117 App. Div. 671, affirmed (19o7) 189 N. Y. 2o8; People ex
rel. Cross v. Ahearn (i9o8) 124 App. Div. 840; People ex rel. Brozning,
King & Co. v. Stover (1911) 145 App. Div. 259; City of N. Y. v. Rice
(191o) 198 N. Y. 124; Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi (1913) 154 App.
Div. 397, affirmed (1915) 215 N. Y. 495.
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will be indicated by a comparison of the opinions in the Court
of Appeals. The fundamental question, of course, relates to
the legislative power to authorize encroachments on the street.
On this point the court in the Jorgensen case said:
"It is competent for the legislature to authorize a limited
use of sidewalks in front of buildings in cities and villages
for stoops or cellar openings or underground vaults for
the more convenient and beneficial enjoyment of the
adjacent premises."'"
In the Ackerman case, on the other hand, the same court, speak-
ing of a statute which was claimed by counsel to authorize the
encroachment there in question, used the following language:
"Moreover, if that statute were to be thus construed,
its constitutionality would be at least doubtful, for even
the legislature cannot authorize the condemnation of
private property for other than public uses. The effect
of a construction which would permit the park board or
any of its members to sell or give the right to obstruct
the streets or highways therein, could not be otherwise
than detrimental to and destructive of the interests of the
municipality and its inhabitants.1'
12
On the hardly less important question as to whether or not the
legislature, granted that it had the power to authorize encroach-
ments, had actually delegated it to the municipal authorities, the
Court of Appeals, after reviewing a long series of statutes,
reached the conclusion that the legislature had conferred upon
the department of public parks the power to authorize encroach-
ments upon the parks and the streets in and around them and
had conferred upon the common council the power to authorize
encroachments on all other streets.13 In the Ackerman case, on
the other hand, the court, upon a construction of a series of
statutes which were substantially identical, declared:
"It becomes quite manifest, we think, that the legislature
did not intend thereby to confer upon a member of the
park board the right to permit an abutting owner upon
any of the streets of the city, whether within any park
or outside, to encroach upon the street by the erection
of permanent and substantial structures thereon.Y4
11 Jorgensen v. Squires (I895) 144 N. Y. 280, 284.
12Ackerman v. True (19o3) 175 N. Y. 353, 365.
1 Wormser v. Brown (1896) 149 N. Y. 163, 167-170.
'4 Ackerman v. True (19o3) 175 N. Y. 353, 365.
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A detailed comparison of the opinions of the Court of Appeals
will disclose various other inconsistencies, but we have given
enough to make clear the radical character of the change in views.
It was so radical, indeed, that the Court of Appeals at last felt
itself compelled to explain how it had come about. The explana-
tion which it offered is to be found in the case of Acme Realty
Co. v. Schinasi.'5  In that case it affirmed a judgment of the
Appellate Division holding that an encroachment on the street,
which was a structural part of an abutting building, constituted
a defect in title which relieved an intending purchaser from his
contract to purchase, although the encroachment was only a
foot in depth. The pertinent passages of its opinion are as
follows:
"We have decided to adopt the views expressed by
Mr. Justice Clarke in the excellent opinion which he wrote
in the case at bar for the majority of his associates at the
Appellate Division; but we deem it proper to supplement
them with a few observations designed to emphasize the
reason for the apparent conflict between the cases cited
by the referee in support of his decision in favor of the
plaintiff [i. e., the Broadbelt and other like cases], and
the more recent adjudications upon which the Appellate
Division 'relies to justify its judgment in favor of the
defendant. We shall endeavor to do this without a cate-
gorical review of the numerous decisions on the subject.
"The reason for the difference between the earlier and
the later judicial decisions on the subject is to be found
in the changed public policy of the municipality. The
case of Broadbelt (supra) was decided by the Appellate
Division in 1897, and by this court in 19oo. From time
almost immemorial it had been the municipal policy to
acquiesce in the practically universal custom of encroach-
ing upon the streets with various building projections.
This policy had its genesis in the infancy of the city and
it had been continued without interruption. Although
the population had reached a large proportion when the
case of Broadbelt was decided, it has since then multiplied
in a constantly ascending ratio of rapidity. The growing
density of population, and the spread of business into
districts that were formerly devoted wholly to residential
structures, have created many perplexing problems in
connection with the use of the streets as public highways.
It is familiar recent history that these changed conditions
have led to the compulsory removal of buiding encroach-
' (1915) 215 N. Y. 495, affirming (913) 154 App. Div. 397.
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ments from the areas, streets and blocks where they had
always before been permitted. When the late Mr. Justice
Patterson wrote the opinion in the case of Broadbelt,
there was nothing to indicate that there would ever be a
radical departure from the early policy of the city with
reference to building encroachments on the streets. Since
then the change has become an accomplished fact, and




The explanation thus offered is of the simplest. Reduced to
its lowest terms it is this: the court declared that it yielded to
the changed attitude of the municipal authorities as to the neces-
sity for putting an end to the appropriation of the streets by
private owners. If this explanation is correct, then we have
an admirable instance of a process which is supposed to be
characteristic of our common or unwritten law: its flexible and
skilful adaptation to the evolutionary progress of the people and
its constant improvement to meet new conditions as they arise.
Unfortunately, however, the explanation is not borne out by the
record or the facts. It was the municipal authorities who
yielded to the courts rather than the courts who yielded to the
municipal authorities. In the first place, as we have seen, upon a
comparison of opinions we find the court holding at one time
that the legislature had power to authorize the appropriation of
a part of the street by abutting owners for their private benefit,
and at another time that such an appropriation was violative
of fundamental constitutional provisions. This was the real point
upon which the court changed its opinion, but it was a point as
to which a change in attitude by the municipal authorities would
naturally be disregarded as immaterial and of no weight. It was
for the court, and not for the municipality, to pass upon the
extent of legislative powers. In the second place, an examination
of the opinion in the Ackerman case, the one which revolu-
tionized the position of the courts, discloses no reference to any
change of attitude by the municipal authorities on any question,
least of all on the question of encroachments on the street, and
nothing to indicate that the Court of Appeals had been made
aware of any such change at all. If the change in the municipal
attitude was in fact the cause of the judicial change, we should
naturally expect to find some mention of that fact in the judicial
opinion. In the third place, and finally, the judicial records
16Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi (1915) 215 N. Y. 495, 502, 504-5.
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themselves show that the court is wrong in its history, and that
the change on the part of the municipal authorities followed the
change on the part of the Court of Appeals, rather than vice
versa. In Mr. Justice Clarke's opinion in the Appellate Division
in the Schinasi case, 17 which was, as we have seen, expressly
adopted by the Court of Appeals, he quoted the two extracts
from the Broadbelt and Levy cases which we have already cited,
and then he went on to say:
"Neither of those opinions could have been written at
the present date. The tremendous growth of the city in
the last decade, the hurrying throngs who press through
its congested streets and avenues, have required the
widening of the roadways and the clearing of the side-
walks. The action of the city authorities has not only
had the approval of the courts but they have compelled
them to take action. (People ex rel. Cross Co. v. Ahear,
124 App. Div. 840; People ex rel. Ackerman v. Stover,
138 id. 237; People ex rel. Browning King & Co. v.
Stover, 145 id. 259.) And there is submitted in the brief
of counsel a table, which is not questioned, of the resolu-
tions passed by the municipal authorities directing the
removal of encroachments in the public streets, fifty-two
in number, passed between July 29, 191m, and March 7,
1912, covering all parts of the city."'"
Thus it appears that the steps which the city authorities took
to remove the encroachments from the business streets of the
city and which the courts cite as the occasion of their reversal
of view, did not even begin until July, 191o. This was seven
years after the Ackerman case was decided. During that
interval the municipal authorities had twice refused to take the
action which the Ackerman case had clearly pointed out as their
legal duty, and twice the courts had been compelled to enforce
the performance of their legal duty by writs of mandamus. In
the case of People ex rel. Cross Co. v. AhearnW1 a writ of
mandamus to remove encroachments was issued to the borough
president, and in the case of People ex re. Ackerman v. Stover"0
a similar writ was issued to the park commissioner. In both
cases the city authorities strenuously resisted the courts in their
efforts to compel the removal of encroachments, even to the
17 Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi (913) 154 App. Div. 397, 410.
18 Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi (913) 154 App. Div. 397, 410-HI.
10 (igo8) I24 App. Div. 84o.
20 (i9Io) 138 App. Div. 237.
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extent of involving the city in the cost of two unfounded and
fruitless appeals. The history of the second case is of consid-
erable interest as showing the final outcome of Mrs. Ackerman's
historic efforts to secure the removal of obnoxious bay windows.
In her action against True she had been defeated in the lower
courts, and it was not until she had been victorious in the Court
of Appeals that she was in a position to enforce her rights.
After she had secured the full declaration of her rights in the
Court of Appeals, however, she found herself practically robbed
of -the fruits of her victory because, during the litigation, the
defendant had transferred his property, with the result that the
Appellate Division ultimately felt itself obliged to dismiss her
action upon the ground that it could not compel True to enter
upon property which he had ceased to own, even for the purpose
of removing an encroachment which was illegal and which he
himself had constructed. 21 Thereupon Mrs. Ackerman brought
proceedings for a mandamus against the park commissioner, who,
in spite of the clear and unambiguous decision of the Court of
Appeals in the action against True, refused to fulfil his legal
duty as therein clearly set forth and appealed to the Appellate
Division.22 It was not until after he had been defeated that the
municipal authorities finally began to take action.
The conclusion is inevitable that the explanation of the Court
of Appeals is incorrect and does not explain. It leaves the
change of opinion, and the reasons for it, as much of a mystery
as before. The change, however, took place; it was radical,
and it was recognized as such both by the Appellate Division.
and the Court of Appeals. Thus in the Williams case, the Appel-
late Division said:
"Whatever cases may be in the books must be held to
be overruled by the Ackerman and the Mclvillan cases-
until, at least, the Court of Appeals has again passed upon
the question."'28
This was followed by the declaration of the Court of Appeals
that
"Our decision of Ackerman v. True has been followed
in several well considered opinions by the Appellate Divi-
21 Ackerman v. True (i9o7) i2o App. Div. 172.
22 People ex rel. Ackerman v. Stover (igxo) 138 App. Div. 237.
28 Williams v. Silverman Realty & Construction Co. (igo6) iii App.
Div. 679.
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In support of its position, it cited the very Williams case which
characterized its action as an overruling of prior decisions. In
a still later case, in response to an argument of counsel based
upon some of its prior decisions, the court said:
"This is doubtless the view expressed in some of the
earlier cases, such as Broadbelt v. Loew (5 App. Div.
343; affirmed by this court on the opinion below in 162
N. Y. 642); ,but those decisions have been superseded
in the more recent cases of Ackerman v. True (175 N. Y.
353); City of N. Y. v. Rice (198 N. Y. 124) and others
which have followed them. ' 2
*g * * *g * *g
The Broadbelt and the earlier cases have been overruled and
swept away. The incident is closed. It is settled for all time
that the legislature has no power to authorize abutting owners to
appropriate public property for their private uses. We say "for
all time," and this is indubitably correct. It is obviously the
right solution, and, because it is right, we may safely assume that
it will never be reversed. As a matter of fact, it has always been
the right solution. As the Court of Appeals has itself declared:
"The title to the streets of the City of New York rests
in the municipality as trustee for the public, and no
grant or permission can be legally given that will inter-
fere with their use by the public. The right of the public
to use the streets is absolute and paramount (Deshong v.
City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. 475, 483). This has always been
the law applicable to the public streets of the City of New
York."2
But if that has always been the law, what of those decisions
of the Court of Appeals to the contrary? If it has always been
the law that the legislature has no power to authorize the private
appropriation of public property, what of the decisions of the
Court of Appeals declaring that it possessed such a power?
The answer is clear, instant, and inexorable, and yet most diffi-
cult of comprehension by a people trained in our system of
jurisprudence: those decisions of the Court of Appeals were
24 City of N. Y. v. Rice (igio) 198 N. Y. 124, 131.
25Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi (1915) 215 N. Y. 495, 504.
2
5Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi (1915) 215 N. Y. 495, 502.
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not the law-even at the time they were rendered. In spite
of what the Court of Appeals said in i9oo, the legislature of
the State of New York did not have in 19oo any power to
authorize abutting owners to appropriate any part of the street
to their private gain. Even the opinion of the Court of Appeals
could not confer a power which the people had withheld.
But if the opinion of the Court of Appeals as to the power of
the legislature was not the law, what of the mandates which it
issued pursuant to that opinion? The answer is similarly clear,
instant, and inexorable, and equally difficult of comprehension
by our people: those mandates, were unlawful at the very instant
of their issuance.
The conception of an unlawful mandate issuing from a court
of last resort with lawful power to determine the cause before
it may seem absurd and impossible; but it is neither absurd,
nor impossible, and is, on the contrary, necessary, logical, and
correct.
No human institution can be free from error. Even a tribunal
charged with the administration of the law will at times commit
mistakes, and instead of enforcing the law, will issue commands
which are in violation of the law. Thus, when the Court of
Appeals2 7 declined to restrain the construction of a bay window
which unlawfully encroached upon the street, upon the ground
that the legislature had authority to authorize the encroachment,
t negatively failed in the performance of its duty to enforce
the law, and unlawfully deprived the plaintiff of his rights.
Again, when, upon the same ground, it enjoined a public official
from performing his duty to remove unlawful encroachments on
the §treet, it affirmatively violated its duty to enforce the law
by forbidding compliance with the law.28  These were unlawful
acts by a court of last resort.
To accept the fact that even a court of last resort can, and
often does, act unlawfully is not in any sense to impugn its
uprightness, or intelligence, or efficiency: it is merely to
recognize the indubitable fact that to err is human.
There must, of course, in the practical administration of every
State come a point of time at which resistance to illegal com-
mands must cease, although they are illegal. If an executive
official issues an illegal command, the citizen may refuse to
27 Worinser v. Brown (1896) 149 N. Y. 163.
28 Hoey v. Gilroy (1892) 129 N. Y. 132.
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obey it and challenge its validity in court. If the judgment of
the court of first instance sustains the illegal command, the
citizen may appeal; but in any system, and in any controversy,
at some time appeals must cease and, rightly or wrongly, an
ultimate decision must be reached. Therefore we establish courts
of last resort, and we accept the fact that their decision in a
particular controversy, whether right or wrong, shall be final
in that cause. It does not follow, however, that it is right
because it is final, and we shall never understand our own sys-
tem of jurisprudence until we understand that final decisions
may be erroneous, that they may not be the law, and that they
may, in fact, be affirmatively illegal.
As a matter of fact, we do vaguely understand it. We do
vaguely perceive that the final decisions of the courts of last
resort may be wrong, and we adopt various devices to correct
their errors. Sometimes we correct them by changing the con-
stitution; sometimes we correct them by statute; sometimes we
try to correct them by the recall of decisions; but more frequently
we leave it to the court of last resort to correct its own errors
of its own accord.
Of all methods of correcting judicial errors, the judicial
method is obviously the wisest, the most effective, and the most
just. The mere fact that there has been error signifies that
there has been injustice and the courts are better fitted to cope
with injustice than any other departnient of an organized state.
Our courts should always be ready, therefore, to apply to their
own errors and injustices the judicial method of correction. A
frank acknowledgment that they can be, and are, on occasion,
mistaken, and an open-minded reception of lawyer-like and
respectful arguments tending to point out errors, will not in the
slightest degree undermine their authority, or diminish the respect
in which they are .held. On the contrary, the more tolerant
and approachable the court is, the greater will be the popular
confidence in its decisions. In fact, the strongest bulwark which
the courts can erect against the recall and other insidious attacks
upon our judicial system will be found in the recognized practice
by the courts themselves of the principle that judicial errors are
to be judicially corrected.
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